Concept

Indonesia–Muslim world integration roadmap: priorities, capabilities, and measures of success

An analysis of the 2025 BSKLN-UII report on strategic direction, regional focal points, and integration targets for Indonesia and the Muslim world through 2045.

Reviewed31 July 202613 min read
Table of contents

Short answer

BSKLN Kemlu and the UII International Relations Program launched Mengintegrasikan Indonesia dan Dunia Islam: Arah, Kerangka, dan Peta Jalan (Integrating Indonesia and the Muslim World: Direction, Framework, and Roadmap) in January 2026, the most detailed strategic planning document an Indonesian government institution has produced on Indonesia’s relationship with the Muslim world 1. At 127 pages, the report was produced by a government agency, yet it carries an explicit disclaimer: its contents “do not necessarily represent the official position of the Indonesian government” 2. These two features appear contradictory, and the tension between them is one thread this analysis unpacks.

Three questions form the core of the testing. First, does the proposed strategic direction account for the OIC institutional constraints documented in the analysis of the modern Muslim world? Second, do the targets and phases align with Indonesia’s measured material capabilities? And third, the most personal, to what extent can this document be read as “Anis Matta’s roadmap”? Anis himself used that label in his November 2025 Unismuh public lecture: “this year, we have undertaken a collaboration with UII Yogyakarta to create a roadmap called the Indonesia Integration with the Muslim World Roadmap. It began early last year and, alhamdulillah, it is now finished” 3.

The report is an institutional product, written by a research team and published by BSKLN, but it emerged from an initiative led directly by Anis Matta as Deputy Foreign Minister for Muslim World Affairs. It should not be read as a substitute for Anis’s personal intellectual frameworks, which are analyzed in the article on Anis Matta’s frameworks for Indonesia and the Muslim world. What is tested here is the policy document, not the personal framework. The report’s status as an academic proposal, not adopted government policy, should also be maintained.

What this document is and is not

Document identity

The report was written by eight researchers: Irawan Jati, Hasbi Aswar, Hadza Min Fadhli Robby, Masitoh Nur Rohma, Mohamad Rezky Utama, Rizki Dian Nursita, Imam Khairul Muslim Hawari, and Nasta Ayu 1. Its publisher is the Center for Policy Strategy for Asia-Pacific and African Regions, BSKLN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its research partner is the UII International Relations Program. Anis Matta is not listed as an author.

The report has three sections: a conceptual framework on integration and Muslim-world discourse (Part I), a survey of the contemporary Muslim world (Part II), and the roadmap design (Part III). The method used is qualitative review with a SOAR (Strengths, Opportunities, Aspirations, Results) approach 1.

Relationship to Anis Matta

Anis Matta initiated this roadmap in his capacity as Deputy Foreign Minister handling the Muslim World portfolio. In his November 2025 Unismuh lecture, he stated: “this year, we have undertaken a collaboration with UII Yogyakarta to create a roadmap called the Indonesia Integration with the Muslim World Roadmap. It began early last year and, alhamdulillah, it is now finished” 3. BSKLN Kemlu produced the report together with UII and launched it publicly in January 2026.

This document is the institutional output of an initiative he led. For readers following the article on Anis Matta’s personal frameworks, the distinction matters: that article tests four frameworks Anis articulated orally in lectures and speeches, namely outsider mentality, new superpower, four geopolitical pages, and the roadmap narrative. This article tests the written policy document that emerged from the ministry where he serves as deputy minister. The two are connected but are not the same analytical object.

The complete text of the November 2025 UII lecture, where Anis presented his frameworks to the research team, is not yet available for verification 4. Without it, the precise relationship between what Anis articulated orally and what the research team formulated in the final report requires further examination.

Strategic framework: integration, basins, and focal points

Defining integration: more than “merger”

The report defines integration through three dimensions broader than a dictionary definition: interconnectedness, meaning Indonesia and the Muslim world are connected through many channels beyond formal diplomatic relations; projection of influence, meaning Indonesia’s capacity to shape the Muslim world’s direction; and acknowledgement, meaning the Muslim world recognizes Indonesia’s role and position 5.

This definition is asymmetric. All three dimensions depict Indonesia’s outward movement, without examining how integration might reshape Indonesia’s domestic political landscape. The choice is reasonable for an Indonesian policy document, but it also means the report never tests the reverse direction.

Nearshore Basin and Distant Shore Basin

The report’s most important geographic framework divides the Muslim world into two zones: the Nearshore Basin and the Distant Shore Basin 6.

The Nearshore Basin encompasses Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and Central Asia, regions with a combined Muslim population approaching 500 million, historical connectivity through maritime trade routes, and a low diplomatic load for Indonesia. The report’s argument: Indonesia should prioritize these regions because their historical and economic connections are already in place.

The Distant Shore Basin encompasses the Middle East and North Africa, the core of Islamic discourse and history, but with a high diplomatic load: migrant worker protection, economic asymmetry, and Indonesia’s persistent peripheral perception. The report explicitly states that this region is no longer a primary focal point precisely because Indonesia’s diplomatic investment there is already “exhaustive” and requires repositioning before deeper engagement 7.

This framework carries sound strategic instinct: prioritize low-friction, high-yield regions. But it also carries analytical risk. If integration with the Muslim world does not involve its core, integration into what is being pursued?

Four, six, or five? The regional focal point discrepancy

The report designates four regional focal points based on four criteria: the region’s centrality in Islamic socio-political dynamics, its Islamic cultural and civilizational heritage, its interconnectivity in global political-economic architecture, and its historical ties to Indonesia 8.

The four regions are:

  1. South Asia: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, with a projected 683 million Muslims by 2030; Jama’ah Tabligh networks; spice-route connectivity.
  2. Central Asia: Post-Soviet Turkic republics; Organization of Turkic States; bridge between Asia and Europe.
  3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa; South-South cooperation potential; Indonesian peacemaking models.
  4. East and Southeast Asia: natural connectivity with Indonesia; halal research, Islamic education, religious diplomacy in Muslim-minority contexts.

However, Figure 3.8 in the report labels six regions, including the Middle East and North Africa as well as Russia and Eastern Europe. The prose discusses five groupings, because East and Southeast Asia share one section 9.

This discrepancy is not a mere editing problem. It reveals an unresolved tension between the report’s strategic argument (which seeks to exclude the Middle East from the focal points due to diplomatic fatigue) and its visual presentation (which cannot fully erase the Muslim world’s core region from the map).

Five issue focal points

The report designates five issue focal points across four strategic domains 10:

  1. Politics: Strengthen Indonesia’s leadership as an agenda-setter in the OIC and D-8; reform OIC institutional effectiveness; create a Deputy for Muslim World Affairs within Kemlu’s structure.

  2. Economy: Lead the halal creative economy and Islamic banking sector, with regional focus on Southeast Asia, East Asia, and South Asia; expand bilateral halal certification agreements.

  3. Socio-culture: Build national branding around “Indonesia is Part of the Muslim World”; develop international-standard Islamic Centers in strategic cities; strengthen multitrack diplomacy through NU, Muhammadiyah, and other civil-society organizations.

  4. Education, research, and technology: Position Indonesian Islamic higher education as a global reference; expand international student recruitment; develop joint research on Islamic economics.

  5. Cross-cutting coordination: Coordinate government actors (Kemlu, Kemenag, Kemendikbud, Kemensos), civil-society organizations (NU, Muhammadiyah, DDII, Persis), businesses (Paragon, Mayora, Indofood, Japfa), and humanitarian organizations (Dompet Dhuafa, MER-C, PKPU).

The roadmap: four phases through 2045

The report proposes four implementation phases aligned with Indonesia’s national planning cycles (RPJMN and RPJPN) 11:

Phase Period Primary activity
1 2025–2029 Planning, initial coordination, feasibility studies
2 2029–2034 Pre-implementation planning, field assessment, donor contact
3 2034–2039 Policy implementation
4 2039–2045 Evaluation and preparation for second-stage implementation

The report anchors this phasing to the RPJMN and RPJPN frameworks prepared by Bappenas, a choice that provides institutional mooring but also makes implementation contingent on political continuity. If a subsequent administration changes national planning priorities, the roadmap has no mechanism for independent survival.

Proposed success indicators include the Islamicity Index, V-Dem democracy scores, State of the Global Islamic Economy (SGIE) rankings, and international student enrollment in Indonesian Islamic higher education institutions 12. These indicators are reasonable as measurement tools, but most measure outcomes influenced by factors far beyond Kemlu’s control, making the chain of attribution from policy to result very long and difficult to verify.

Testing against the data: institutional constraints and material capabilities

OIC constraints not confronted

The analysis of the modern Muslim world documents six OIC structural constraints persisting since 1969: consensus as the decision-making principle, non-intervention in domestic affairs, no enforcement mechanism, reliance on voluntary contributions, fragmentation of members’ geopolitical interests, and limited secretariat capacity 13. The 2008 OIC Charter modernized the language but did not alter the fundamental mechanisms.

The BSKLN-UII report briefly acknowledges these constraints and proposes that Indonesia “strengthen its agenda-setting role” in the OIC. But the report does not explain how a deputy foreign minister, or even a president, can change rules of the game that 57 member states have failed to alter over five decades. The proposal to create a Deputy for Muslim World Affairs within Kemlu is a concrete administrative step, but it solves a domestic coordination problem, not a multilateral institutional design problem.

Targets vs. capabilities

The report uses the same data as the analysis of Indonesia’s position: $15.0 billion in defense spending, 1.0% of GDP, 13th globally in conventional military capability 14. These data points are not disputed. The question is whether they support the proposed targets.

Leading the global halal industry is a target better aligned with Indonesia’s capabilities: the SGIE places Indonesia fourth globally and first in the Islamic Finance Index 15. This target is concrete, measurable, and within reach. By contrast, “strengthening leadership as an agenda-setter in the OIC” is an ambitious target with no clear causal path from the available policy instruments to the desired institutional outcome.

Discrepancies, limitations, and missing perspectives

Internal discrepancies

Beyond the 4/6/5 focal-point issue already discussed, the report carries other discrepancies:

  • The report mentions a target of rising 5 ranks in the Islamicity Index every 5 years through 2045, but does not define the baseline against which the rise is measured.
  • The 2025–2029 phase was already underway when the report launched (January 2026), yet no progress report exists on the feasibility studies that should have already begun.
  • The report proposes creating a Deputy for Muslim World Affairs within Kemlu without referencing Presidential Regulation No. 150/2024 on Kemlu’s new organizational structure, leaving the proposal’s legal status unclear.

Missing perspectives

The report is a serious institutional product, but it carries several analytical silences:

  • China and Belt and Road: Chinese investment in Muslim-majority states (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Africa) creates dynamics that directly affect Indonesia’s operating space. The report barely touches this dimension.
  • Problematic non-state actors: The report mentions Jama’ah Tabligh as a positive network for South Asian connectivity, but does not address other non-state actors that shape the Muslim world’s perception of Indonesia, including networks linked to transnational extremism.
  • Sunni-Shia divide: Geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a structural variable in OIC politics. The report does not discuss how Indonesia’s roadmap would navigate between these poles.
  • Critical OIC scholarship: Literature on OIC ineffectiveness (Akbarzadeh, Kayaoglu) is not cited. The report accepts the OIC as a reformable body without testing whether radical reform or alternative forums are more likely to succeed.

What can and cannot yet be assessed

The 2025 BSKLN-UII report is a serious institutional contribution. It provides an operational definition of integration, maps regional priorities based on diplomatic-load calculations, not normative sentiment, and proposes concrete success indicators.

But its value as a strategic document is limited by three factors.

First, ambiguous legal status. The disclaimer places the document in a gray zone. It is not policy, yet it was issued by a policymaking body. It is not independent research, yet it was written by university researchers. The ambiguity may be deliberate, allowing exploration without commitment. But it also means no clear accountability standard exists for measuring whether this roadmap succeeds or fails.

Second, internal discrepancies that reveal strategic tension. The 4/6/5 focal-point problem is a symptom of a deeper question: can Indonesia “integrate itself with the Muslim world” while explicitly downgrading its core? The report’s answer: “yes, through the Nearshore Basin first.” But this answer is not tested against a highly plausible scenario: Nearshore progress does not automatically produce Distant Shore influence.

Third, the gap between targets and instruments. Improving OIC effectiveness is a diagnostically correct target. But the proposed instruments, including an agenda-setting role, better coordination, and a new deputy, are administrative tools for a structural problem. This is not a failure of the report so much as a limit of its genre: a policy paper can frame the problem and open an institutional conversation, but it cannot build the bridge between a proposal on paper and a policy reality that requires political commitment across administrations.

Related articles:

  • The modern Muslim world: states, governance, and institutions.
  • Indonesia’s geopolitical position and strategic choices.
  • Anis Matta: Indonesia, the Muslim world, and a geopolitical framework.

Footnotes

  1. Irawan Jati et al., Mengintegrasikan Indonesia dan Dunia Islam: Arah, Kerangka, dan Peta Jalan (Jakarta: BSKLN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). A 127-page policy research report, launched publicly on January 13, 2026. Available through the Kemlu public information service. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. The report states that its contents “do not necessarily represent the official position of the Indonesian government.” See the report’s opening pages. ↩

  3. Anis Matta, Unismuh Makassar public lecture, November 17, 2025, around 01:07:02. “this year, we have undertaken a collaboration with UII Yogyakarta to create a roadmap called the Indonesia Integration with the Muslim World Roadmap. It began early last year and, alhamdulillah, it is now finished.” ↩ ↩2

  4. UII lecture, November 2025. A complete text is unavailable. ↩

  5. BSKLN-UII, Part I, pp. 7–8. Integration defined as interconnectedness, projection of influence, and acknowledgement. ↩

  6. BSKLN-UII, Part II, pp. 48–49. Nearshore Basin and Distant Shore Basin concepts. ↩

  7. BSKLN-UII, Part III, p. 85. “Peletakan Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara ini bukan bermakna dearabisasi atau menganggap bahwa kawasan ini bukan kawasan sentral Dunia Islam, namun sebagai upaya untuk merefleksikan dan mereposisi Indonesia di core Dunia Islam sebelum melakukan engagement lebih intensif.” ↩

  8. BSKLN-UII, Part III, p. 81. Focal point selection criteria: centrality, cultural heritage, interconnectivity, and historical ties. ↩

  9. BSKLN-UII, Part III. The text states four focal points (p. 81), Figure 3.8 labels six regions, and the prose discusses five groupings because East and Southeast Asia share one section. ↩

  10. BSKLN-UII, Part III, pp. 86–126. Five issue focal points across four strategic domains: politics, economy, socio-culture, and education/research/technology. ↩

  11. BSKLN-UII, Part III, pp. 91–92. Four phases: 2025–2029, 2029–2034, 2034–2039, 2039–2045. ↩

  12. BSKLN-UII, Part III, p. 92. Success indicators: Islamicity Index, V-Dem, SGIE, international student enrollment. ↩

  13. See “The modern Muslim world: states, governance, and institutions” for documentation of the six OIC structural constraints. ↩

  14. See “Indonesia’s geopolitical position and strategic choices” for Indonesia’s material capability data. ↩

  15. DinarStandard, State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 2024/2025. ↩